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In this paper I obtain the mixed strategy symmetric equilibria of
the ﬁrst-price auction for any distribution. The equilibrium is unique.
The solution turns out to be a combination of absolutely continuous
distributions case and the discrete distributions case.
1 Introduction
In the early literature1 on auction theory there are two papers that deal
with the sale of one object by sealed bid ﬁrst price auctions: Vickrey (1961)
and Griesmer, Levitan and Shubik (1967). Vickrey analyses a symmetric
ﬁrst-price auction with several bidders and a uniform distribution of types.
He also analyses two asymmetric models. One with two bidders and two
uniform distributions with distinct supports. His analysis is incomplete in
this case and supposing one of the distributions degenerated he proceeds
with a complete analysis. The paper by Griesmer, Levitan and Shubik gives
a detailed treatment of the two ﬁrms with two distinct intervals of costs,
uniformly distributed case. Perhaps these two papers justify the present
predominance of the symmetric model. They show– by example– that even
∗I acknowledge the comments of Carlos da Costa.
†I acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of CNPQ
1Here I follow P. Klemperer’s (2000).
1the most natural generalization2 originates a forest of complications and a
need for a very careful analysis. In this paper I consider private values,
symmetric, ﬁrst-price auctions. My focus will be conceptual. To understand
my motivation let me look at two usual although diametrically opposite cases.
The most common assumption on the distribution of bidders valuations,
F : [a,b] → [0,1], is that it has a strictly positive density, f = F 0. The
equilibrium bidding function is easy to ﬁnd3 and has a nice interpretation:
it is the expected value of the second highest valuation given that the bidder
has the highest valuation. The opposite case of a discrete distribution is
considered mainly for examples.4 The equilibrium in the discrete case is in
mixed strategies. There is also a kind of monotonicity in that a bidder with
a higher valuation always bids higher than bidders with lower valuations. To
see this brieﬂy consider a two types distribution, say each type v ∈ {0,1}
occurs with probability 1
2. Then a bidder with v = 0 bids 0 and a bidder
with v = 1 bids in the interval [0,b] with probability G(b) = b
1−b,0 ≤ b ≤ 1
2.
What is the equilibrium if the distribution, F, is not absolutely continuous
and is not discrete? We will see that the symmetric equilibrium exists and
has two parts. A pure strategy part at the points of continuity of F and a
mixed strategy part at the points of discontinuities of F.
The second result of the paper is the unicity of the symmetric equilibrium.
It is possible that the equilibrium be unique not only amongst the symmetric
ones. This is probably very diﬃcult to prove in the general case. For example
the techniques of Maskin and Riley (2003) and more recently Lebrun (2006)
uses diﬀerential equations.
The last result in the paper ﬁnd the equilibrium if the set of types is
multi-dimensional. This will be easy. Its main interest being to show that
neither monotonicity nor continuity plays a role in the general case.
2 Preliminaries
In this section I collect some basic deﬁnitions and auxiliary results. I begin
recalling the deﬁnition of a distribution.
Deﬁnition 1 A function F : R → [0,1] is a distribution if
1. F is increasing: x < y ⇒ F (x) ≤ F (y);






4Thus Riley (1989) use a discrete distribution to present in simple mathematical terms
the revenue equivalence theorem.
22. F is right-continuous: F (x) = limy↑x F (y) and
3. limx→−∞ F (x) = 0 and limx→∞ F (x) = 1.
If F is a distribution so is F m for every m > 0. If F is a distribution
deﬁne
v := inf {x : F (x) > 0} and
¯ v := sup{x;F (x) < 1}.
Throughout this paper I suppose that ∞ > ¯ v > v ≥ 0. Abusing notation, I
denote by F the restriction F|[v,¯ v]. This entails no confusion. Deﬁne C as the
set of continuity of F|[v,¯ v] and D the set of discontinuities of F|[v,¯ v]. Then D
is countable.5 Moreover
D ={x ∈ (v, ¯ v];F (x) > F (x−)}.
As usual F (x−) := sup{F (y);y < x} = limy↑x F (y). The following func-
tion is the main ingredient of the equilibrium strategy:
Deﬁnition 2 Deﬁne bF : [v, ¯ v] → R by bF (v) = v and
bF (v) = v −
R v
v F n−1 (y)dy
F n−1 (v)
,v ∈ (v, ¯ v]. (1)
Remark 1 It is easy to check, using integration by parts that
bF (v) =
R v
v− ydF n−1 (y)
F n−1 (v)
. (2)
This expression shows that bF can be interpreted as the expected value of the
second highest valuation given that the highest valuation is v. If F has a




In the next lemma I prove the basic properties of bF.
Lemma 1 The following properties are true:
(i) bF (v) < v if v > v;
(ii) F (v0) < F (v00) if and only if bF (v0) < bF (v00);
5Since F is monotonic.
3(iii) bF is right-continuous, increasing and
{x ∈ [v, ¯ v];bF is continuous at x} = C.
(iv)
(v − b(v−))F
n−1 (v−) = (v − b(v))F
n−1 (v). (3)
Proof:
(i) Suppose v > v. The deﬁnition of v implies that F (y) > 0 in a neighbor-
hood of v. Thus
R v
v F n−1 (y)dy > 0 and from (1), bF (v) < v.








v− ydF n−1 (y) +
R v00
v0 ydF n−1 (y)
F n−1 (v00)
=
b(v0)F n−1 (v0) +
R v00
v0 ydF n−1 (y)
F n−1 (v00)
.
Thus using (i) above,
R v00
v0 ydF n−1 (y) > b(v0)(F n−1 (v00) − F n−1 (v0))
and b(v00) > b(v0). Now if F (v0) = F (v00) then
R v00
v0 ydF n−1 (y) = 0 and
b(v00) = b(v0).
(iii) From (1) the right-continuity of bF follows directly from the right-




b is continuous at v if and only if F is continuous at v. Moreover b is
discontinuous at v if and only if b(v−) < b(v).






n−1 (y)dy = (v − b(v−))F
n−1 (v−).
QED
The next lemmas ﬁnishes our preliminary work.
Lemma 2 For any v ∈ [v,v],
max
y (v − b(y))F




n−1 (y) = vF














Since v − x ≥ 0 if and only if x ≤ v the last integral is maximized at y = v.
QED
Lemma 3 Suppose v ∈ D and v > v. Then the following is true:
1. The function Gv : [b(v−),b(v)] → [0,1]
Gv (x) =
F (v−)










is a continuous, strictly increasing distribution.
2. For any x ∈ [b(v−),b(v)],
(v − x)
 
F (v−) + (F (v) − F (v−))Gv (x)
n−1 = (v − b(v))F
n−1 (v).
(5)
Proof: (1) It is immediate that Gv (b(v−)) = 0 and that Gv is continuous.
Moreover since v − b(v−) > 0 the function Gv is strictly increasing. Finally
using (3) we have that
Gv (b(v)) =
F (v−)





















(2) Suppose x ∈ [b(v−),b(v)]. Then








(v − x)((F (v) − F (v−))Gv (x) + F (v−))
n−1 =
F
n−1 (v−)(v − b(v−)) = F
n−1 (v)(v − b(v)).
QED
53 The equilibrium
There are n bidders participating in a ﬁrst-price auction. Values are private
and bidders types are independent identically distributed according to the
distribution F : [v,v] → [0,1]. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies. How-
ever it is not very wild. The mixed part occurs only at the discontinuities of
F (which are countable). Moreover the support of the mixed strategies are
non-intersecting and monotonic.
The equilibrium strategy is composed of two parts. First if v ∈ [v,v] ∩ C
the bidder bids b(v) where b = bF is deﬁned by (1). If v ∈ D the bidder
bids the mixed strategy µGv. Thus for every x ∈ [b(v−),b(v)] he bids in the
interval [b(v−),x] with probability Gv (x). Deﬁne M = (µv)v∈[v,¯ v] where
µv =

pure strategy b(v) if v ∈ C,
mixed strategy Gv if v ∈ D.
Thus the pure strategy b(v) is played at the continuity points of the distribu-
tion and the mixed strategy Gv is played if the distribution is discontinuous
at v. I need the distribution of bids generated by M. The next two lemmas
complete this step.
Lemma 4 For every x ∈ [v,b(¯ v)] there exists the smallest ω ∈ [v, ¯ v] such
that b(ω−) ≤ x ≤ b(ω).
Proof: Deﬁne for x ∈ [v,b(¯ v)], ωr = ωr (x) := inf {ω;b(ω) ≥ x}. From the
right-continuity of b we conclude that x ≤ b(ωr). For any ω < ωr it is true
that b(ω) < x and therefore b(ωr−) ≤ x. That ωr is the smallest is clear
from its deﬁnition. QED
The following corollary is follows immediately:
Corollary 1 Let Bi be the random variable of bidder i bids. The distribution
of Bi is
Pr(Bi ≤ x) = F (ω
r−) + (F (ω
r) − F (ω
r−))Gωr (x).
In particular Pr(Bi = x) = 0 for every x > v.
Theorem 1 The mixed strategy M is a symmetric equilibrium of the ﬁrst-
price auction.
Proof: Suppose bidders i = 2,...,n bids the mixed strategy M. Suppose
bidder 1 has valuation v. The corollary above shows that if bidder 1 bids
6x the probability of a tie is null. Thus if he bids x = b(y−) + δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤
b(y) − b(y−), his expected utility is
φ = (v − x)
 





F (y−) + (F (y) − F (y−))Gy (x)








Since6 φ increases in x if and only if v > y it follows that:
if v > y, φ ≤ (v − b(y))F
n−1 (y);






n−1 (y−) = (v − b(y))F
n−1 (y).
In any case
φ ≤ (v − b(y))F
n−1 (y) ≤ (v − b(v))F
n−1 (v).
Thus y = v is the best reply. And if v is a point of discontinuity, x ∈
[b(v−),b(v)] is bid accordingly to Gv (·) is a best response. QED
4 Unicity of the mixed strategy equilibrium
In this section I show that the mixed strategy equilibrium M is unique.
Theorem 2 Suppose Υ = (τv)v∈[v,v] is a mixed strategy symmetric equilib-
rium. Then Υ = M.
To simplify the notation a bit I suppose v = 0. Deﬁne Hi as the distri-





Deﬁne also G as the distribution of the maximum bid of bidders j 6= i. Thus
G(x) = Hn−1 (x). Denote by P the set of Borelean probabilities measures










7Lemma 5 Suppose φ : R → R is measurable and bounded, ¯ µ ∈ P and that
Z




Then φmax := maxz∈R φ(z) exists and ¯ µ({z;φ(z) 6= φmax}) = 0.







φ(z)dδx (z);x ∈ R








(M − φ(z))d¯ µ(z) = M −
Z
φ(z)d¯ v (z) = 0.
Hence φ(z) = M for almost every z with respect to ¯ µ and therefore the
supremum is achieved and ¯ µ({z;φ(z) 6= φmax}) = 0. QED
Let us now consider bidder i with valuation v. Since Υ is an equilibrium the
best reply is τv. If there is a tie we suppose that the tie is solved with equal






j!(n − 1 − j)!
H
n−1−j (x−) ·





(v − b) e G(b)dτv (b) = sup
τ∈P
Z
(v − b) e G(b)dτ (b).
The lemma above implies that
Av =

¯ x ≥ 0;(v − ¯ x) e G(¯ x) = max
x≥0





Lemma 6 For every v > 0, H (v) > 0.
8Proof: Let ˜ v = inf {v;H (v) > 0}. Suppose ˜ v > v ≥ 0. If τv(˜ v, ¯ v] > 0
then there is a b0 > ˜ v such that b ∈ Av. However (v − b0) e G(b0) < 0 since
e G(b0) ≥ Hn−1 (b0−) > 0. Thus τv(˜ v, ¯ v] = 0. From
H (˜ v) =
Z ¯ v
0−
τy[0, ˜ v]dF (y) ≥ F (˜ v−) > 0
we conclude that H (˜ v) > 0. Thus since e G(˜ v) ≥ Hn−1 (˜ v) > 0 the reasoning
above implies ˜ v / ∈ Av. Hence τv[0, ˜ v) = 1 for every v < ˜ v. Now
0 = H (˜ v−) =
Z ¯ v
0−
τy[0,e v)dF (y) ≥ F (˜ v−) > 0,
a contradiction. Therefore ˜ v = 0. QED
Lemma 7 For any v the distribution H is continuous on Av.
Proof: First note from expression (6) that H (x) = H (x−) if and only if
e G(x) = Hn−1 (x). Now if ¯ b ∈ Av and bm ↓ ¯ b through points of continuity of






e G(bm) = lim
m→∞H











Lemma 8 If v0 < v00 then supAv0 ≤ inf Av00.
Proof: Suppose v0 < v00 and that there exist b0 ∈ Av0,b00 ∈ Av00 such that















Adding and collecting terms (v00 − v0)

e G(b00) − e G(b0)

≥ 0. Hence







and therefore b0 ≤ b00. Thus b0 = b00. QED
Lemma 9 Suppose now that #Av > 1. Then v ∈ D.




00) = e G(b




Thus H (b00) > H (b0). Now if  < b00 − b0l,
0 < H (b









00 − ]dF (y) = τv(b
0,b
00 − ](F (v) − F (v−)). (8)
In (8) I used Lemma 8. Thus F (v) − F (v−) > 0. QED
Lemma 10 For every b ≥ 0,v ∈ D we have that τv (b) = 0. In particular H
is continuous in (inf Av,supAv).
Proof: If b / ∈ Av then 0 ≤ τv (b) ≤ τv (Ac
v) = 0. If b ∈ Av then
0 = H (b) − H (b−) =
Z
τy {b}dF (y).
Therefore τy {b} = 0 for almost every y with respect to F. Hence τv {b} = 0.
QED
Lemma 11 Suppose b0 < b00 are elements of Av,v ∈ D. Then (b0,b00) ∩ Av 6=
∅.
Proof: Since (v − b0)Hn−1 (b0) = (v − b00)Hn−1 (b00) and b0 < b00 it follows
that H (b00) > H (b0). Now
0 < H (b





00]dF (y) = τv(b
0,b
00](F (v) − F (v−))
and therefore τv (b0,b00) = τv(b0,b00] > 0 ending the proof.
Lemma 12 For every v ∈ D, Av ⊃ (inf Av,supAv).
Proof: Suppose v ∈ D. For any x ∈ (inf Av,supAv) deﬁne
¯ x = inf {b ∈ Av;b > x}.




(v − b) e G(b);b ≥ 0
o
10it is true that
φ
max = (v − bl)H
n−1 (bl) → (v − ¯ x)H
n−1 (¯ x−) = (v − ¯ x) e G(¯ x).
Thus ¯ x ∈ Av. Analogously we deﬁne x :
x = sup{b ∈ Av;b < x}.
Thus x ∈ Av. Now if x < ¯ x then (x, ¯ x) ∩ Av = ∅ a contradiction. Hence
x = ¯ x = x. QED
Deﬁne b(v) as the pure strategy played when v ∈ C. And if v ∈ D deﬁne
b(v) = infω>v b(ω). Thus b is increasing and right-continuous. We have that
H (b(v)) =
Z
τy ([0,b(v)])dF (y) = F (v).
Theorem 3 For every v, b(v) = bF (v).
Proof: Suppose v ∈ C. Then for every ω ∈ C,
(v − b(v))F
n−1 (v) ≥ (v − b(ω))F
n−1 (ω).
By the right-continuity of b and F this is also true for every ω and for every








n−1 (v) − b(ω)F
n−1 (ω).








n−1 (ω) − b(v)F
n−1 (v).








n−1 (v) − b(ω)F
n−1 (ω),
b(v)F
n−1 (v) − b(ω)F
n−1 (ω) ≥ ω
 
F




Take ω0 = v < ω1 < ... < ωN = ¯ v a partition of [v, ¯ v] such that
maxj |ωj+1 − ωj| < 1



































    
N X
j=1
ωj+1χ(ωj,ωj+1] (y) − y
    
≤ max
j
|ωj+1 − ωj| <
1
N




n−1 (y) ≥ b(v)F
n−1 (v). (9)
The other inequality is obtained from the inequality in (#). QED
Thus the pure strategy part is unique. The unicity of the mixed strategy is
proved in an analogous manner.
Theorem 4 The mixed strategy τv is unique for each v ∈ D.
Proof: Let us consider v ∈ D. Suppose b ∈ Av,b < supAv. Then
H (b) − H (b(v−)) =
Z
τy(b(v−),b]dF (y) = τv(b(v−),b](F (v) − F (v−)).
Therefore
H (b) = F (v−) + τv(b(v−),b](F (v) − F (v−)).
Since τv cannot have mass points,
(v − b)
 
F (v−)+τv(b(v−),b](F (v) − F (v−))













F (v) − F (v−)
.
QED
5 Example and application.
I now show how the general multi-dimensional set of types case is reduced
to a one dimensional case in complete generality. Suppose the set of types
is the probability space (T,T ,P). A bidder with type t ∈ T has a utility
U (t) when receiving the object. The function U : T → R is bounded and
measurable. Deﬁne
F (x) = Pr(U (t) ≤ x),x ∈ U (T)
12the distribution of U. Deﬁne v = inf U(T) and ¯ v = supU(T). Deﬁne also
bU = bF ◦ U and GU
t = GU(t). The equilibrium is then to bid bU (t) if F
is continuous at U (t) and the mixed strategy GU
t if F is discontinuous at
U (t). I ﬁnish with an example showing how to calculate the mixed strategies
support.





Pr(v = 0) = a,
Pr(v = 1) = b
Pr(v = 2) = 1 − a − b
,a > 0,b > 0,a + b < 1.
The bidders with a zero valuation bids 0. A bidder with valuation 1 bids in
the interval [b(1−),b(1)],
















,b(2) = 2(1 − a − b) + b = 2 − 2a + b.
If a = b = 1/2 we recover the example in the introduction.
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